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I. Introduction
The Supreme Court did not acknowledge the impending
fiftieth anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright1 when it cited the
case last Term in Martinez v. Ryan.2 But the Court did speak
glowingly of the right enshrined by the landmark case. The right
to the effective assistance of counsel at trial “is a bedrock
principle in our justice system,” the Court explained;3 indeed, the

∗ Clinical Professor of Law, U.C. Berkeley School of Law. I am grateful
for thoughtful feedback on earlier drafts from the editors of the Washington and
Lee Law Review, Eric Freedman, Paula Harms, Chris Lasch, Andrea Roth,
Bidish Sarma, Elisabeth Semel, Giovanna Shay, Tamar Todd, Amanda Tyler,
and Chuck Weisselberg. Many thanks to Rebecca Popuch for outstanding
research assistance. I am indebted to J.D. King for his insightful comments on
this footnote.
1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
3. Id. at 1312.
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Court continued, “the right to counsel is the foundation for our
adversary system.”4
What to do, then, when a defendant is afforded an attorney
at trial but the attorney is not effective?5 Specifically, what is the
appropriate mechanism for vindicating the right to effective
counsel, especially for the vast majority of criminal defendants
convicted of noncapital crimes, whose ability to secure
postconviction counsel is effectively nil? In other words, how does
a criminal defendant remedy the deprivation of a right that he
cannot raise procedurally until he is no longer constitutionally
entitled to an attorney? The Court did not use Martinez as a
vehicle to resolve this critical issue, but its surprising ruling in
the case, coupled with its ruling during the same Term in Maples
v. Thomas,6 provides some indication of where this complicated
area of law may be headed.
Martinez was a sleeper case that did not register so much as
a blip in the popular press at the time it was decided.7 Even in
the legal media and academic circles, the decision did not initially
stand out.8 Justice Kennedy, who wrote the opinion for the Court,
4. Id. at 1317.
5. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932) (noting that appointed
counsel must provide “effective and substantial aid”).
6. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012).
7. A Lexis-Nexis search for news articles referencing Martinez written in
the month following the decision produced only one article in the mainstream
press. The article, printed in the Houston Chronicle, mentions Martinez in
conjunction with the case of Texas death row inmate Robert Gene Will II, who
has thus far been denied the opportunity to pursue federal habeas corpus relief
despite significant evidence suggesting his actual innocence. Mike Tolson, Death
Row—Bid to Spare Life Gains Traction, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 2, 2012, at A1,
available
at
http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Death-rowinmate-s-effort-to-spare-live-gains-3450225.php.
8. A search of legal journals and blogs in the immediate wake of the
Martinez ruling produced very few discussions of the opinion. See Douglas A.
Berman, Via Narrow 7–2 Ruling for Defendant, SCOTUS Dodges Sixth
Amendment Issue in Martinez v. Ryan, SENTENCING L. AND POL’Y (Mar. 20, 2012,
10:30 AM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2012/03/vianarrow-7-2-ruling-for-defendant-scotus-dodges-sixth-amendment-issue-in-martinezv-ryan.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (noting that, in narrowly tailoring its
decision, the Court in Martinez avoids addressing larger issues regarding a
prisoner’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); Nancy King, Court Surprises in Martinez v. Ryan,
HABEASBOOK.COM, (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.habeasbook.com/2012/03/court-
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could hardly have presented the issue in the case more
dispassionately: “[W]hether a federal habeas court may excuse a
procedural default of an ineffective assistance [of counsel] claim
when the claim was not properly presented in state court due to
an attorney’s error in an initial-review collateral proceeding.”9
The matter-of-fact recitation of the procedural complexities,
however, undersold what is perhaps one of the most enduringly
challenging aspects of applying Gideon: how to actualize Gideon’s
guarantee when most criminal defendants are stymied in their
efforts to claim that their trial lawyers were ineffective.
Despite the initially muted reaction to the Martinez decision,
there are at least two indications of its importance. First, the
opinion has now spawned voluminous commentary10 and
drops-a-bombshell-in-martinez/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (asserting that the
Martinez Court introduced an unusual standard—that federal review of an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is warranted only when the claim is
“substantial” and “has some merit”—without laying out how a prisoner could
satisfy the standard) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Steve
Vladeck, Opinion Analysis: A New Remedy, But No Right, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar.
21, 2012, 10:30 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/opinion-analysis-a-newremedy-but-no-right/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (noting that, in Martinez, the
Court did not directly address whether prisoners are constitutionally entitled to
effective assistance of postconviction counsel) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review). Prior to the rulings in Martinez and Maples, Lee Kovarsky
published a blog post suggesting the Court may use the cases to “deliver a
watershed in criminal procedure” but one that would remain “largely unnoticed
outside an enclave of highly-specialized habeas lawyers.” Lee Kovarsky, Maples
and Martinez: Gideon for State Post-Conviction Review, PRAWFSBLAWG (Oct. 2,
2011, 1:16 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/10/maples-vthomas-and-martinez-v-ryan-gideon-in-the-state-post-conviction-era.html (last
visited Apr. 2, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The
Court did not, as Kovarsky thought it might, choose to “constitutionalize a slice
of state post-conviction review,” but he was prescient to highlight the
importance of the cases. Id. He also noted that the potential importance of
Martinez was not lost on government lawyers; twenty-four states and the
federal government signed briefs urging the Court in Martinez not to create a
constitutional right to postconviction counsel. Id.
9. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1313 (2012).
10. E.g., Eric Freedman, Enforcing the ABA Guidelines in Capital State
Post-Conviction Proceedings After Martinez and Pinholster, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Freedman, Enforcing the ABA Guidelines];
Giovanna Shay, The New State Postconviction, 46 AKRON L. REV. (forthcoming
2013); Nancy King, Preview: A Preliminary Survey of Issues Raised by Martinez
v. Ryan, in LAFAVE, ISRAEL, KING & KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (3d ed. Supp.
2012–2013) (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2147164; Lawrence
Kornreich & Alexander I. Platt, The Temptation of Martinez v. Ryan: Legal
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extensive litigation.11 Indeed, the Supreme Court will soon decide
its first post-Martinez case.12 Second, the sarcasm and bitterness
that pervades Justice Scalia’s dissent appears to reflect the
significance that at least he attached to the lasting effect, or
potential for future expansion, of the majority opinion. Here, the
dissent’s opening words are the giveaway: “Let me get this
straight.”13
To back up and provide some context, Gideon held that the
Sixth Amendment requires states to provide counsel to indigent
criminal defendants at trial.14 The complete failure to provide
counsel is an issue that can be raised on direct appeal in an
individual case (as Clarence Earl Gideon did), or perhaps through
a federal civil rights lawsuit.15 With respect to classes of
Ethics for the Habeas Bar, 8 CRIM. L. BRIEF (2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2139506;
Emily
Garcia
Uhrig, The Sacrifice of Unarmed Prisoners to Gladiators: The Post-AEDPA
Access-to-the-Courts Demand for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal
Habeas Corpus, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1219, 1280 (2012); Eve Brensike Primus,
Effective Trial Counsel After Martinez v. Ryan: Focusing on the Adequacy of
State Procedures, YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Primus, Effective
Trial Counsel], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2203391; David M. Barron, Martinez Casts Doubt on State Postconviction and
Federal Habeas Representation, 27-FALL CRIM. JUST. 42, 42 (2012).
11. See, e.g., Dansby v. Norris, 682 F.3d 711, 729 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding
that Martinez does not apply to the petitioner’s ineffectiveness of trial counsel
claim “because Arkansas does not bar a defendant from raising claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal”); Ibarra v. Thaler, 687
F.3d 222, 226–27 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that state habeas counsel’s failure to
raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in collateral proceedings is not
cause to excuse procedural default and that Martinez applies only to
ineffectiveness claims); Banks v. Workman, 692 F.3d 1133, 1148 (10th Cir.
2012) (holding that, because Oklahoma law permitted the petitioner to assert
his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal, the failure of
petitioner’s postconviction counsel to present his claim is not cause for the
default); Cook v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 598, 609–10 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that
Martinez does not apply to a petitioner who represented himself at trial). A
review on Lexis-Nexis for cases citing Martinez in the ten months following the
ruling reveals 494 cases.
12. See Trevino v. Thaler, 449 F. App’x 415 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted,
133 S. Ct. 524 (Oct. 29, 2012) (No. 11-10189). For discussion of Trevino, see infra
note 33.
13. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1321 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
14. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963).
15. In Colorado, for example, advocates recently filed a federal lawsuit
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defendants to whom the courts have not yet applied Gideon,
legislative and other policy advocacy can be fruitful.16 When trial
counsel has been appointed, however, it is only through a
posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that an
individual defendant can seek a new trial based on the failure of
the state to provide constitutionally adequate counsel.17
Most ineffectiveness claims depend on discovery and
investigation of facts that are outside of the trial record.18 For
challenging the constitutionality of a state law that “statutorily requires
indigent defendants in misdemeanor cases to consult with prosecutors about
plea deals before they can receive their constitutional right to counsel.” David
Carroll, Gideon Alert: Lawsuit Challenges Colorado Law Refusing Appointment
of Counsel Until After Clients Meet with DA, NLADA (Dec. 12, 2012, 12:31 PM),
http://www.nlada.net/jseri/gideon-blog/co_complaintfiledinmisdrsuit12-12-2010_
gideonalert (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
16. See AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE: HOW AMERICA HOLDS COURT 11–76
(2010) (identifying failures in state indigent defense systems nationwide); J.D.
King, Procedural Justice, Collateral Consequences, and the Adjudication of
Misdemeanors, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 33–36 (Erik
Luna & Marianne Wade eds., 2011) (positing that there is an egregious lack of
competent criminal defense available for indigent misdemeanor criminal
defendants because both prosecutors and public defenders focus their attention
on more serious crimes); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining
Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277,
371–72 (2011) (arguing for the development of standards governing the
representation of misdemeanor criminal defendants and for structural reform in
the misdemeanor criminal system).
17. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685–98 (1984) (articulating
the components of and justifications for the ineffective assistance of counsel
claim and the convicted defendant’s burden of proof).
18. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505 (2003) (explaining that
most ineffective assistance of counsel claims require “additional factual
development” beyond what is contained in the trial record); Clive A. Stafford
Smith & Rémy Voisin Starns, Folly by Fiat: Pretending that Death Row Inmates
Can Represent Themselves in State Capital Post-Conviction Proceedings, 45 LOY.
L. REV. 55, 90 (1999)
[A]n ineffectiveness claim is classically an issue that requires
additional evidentiary development. While there are various claims of
ineffectiveness that focus on the trial record, “[a]t the heart of
effective representation is the independent duty to investigate and
prepare.” If trial counsel did not prepare, then the post-conviction
advocate must not only prove this (by contacting trial counsel and
securing his admission), but must also demonstrate prejudice—i.e.,
show the difference that the proper investigation would have made to
the outcome of the completed trial. Obviously, the only way this can
be done is to perform the investigation himself.
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this reason, such claims are typically brought, if at all, in
postconviction collateral proceedings.19 As Lee Kovarsky put it,
“The
reasons
why
inmates
must
press
trial-phase
[ineffectiveness] claims collaterally are intuitive: a trial lawyer
won’t litigate his/her own ineffectiveness on appeal, and even a
substituted appellate lawyer is not equipped to litigate a trialphase [ineffectiveness] claim without a reconstructed record.”20
The development of ineffectiveness claims almost always
requires the aid of counsel.21 This is a problematic requirement
(quoting Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 805 (11th Cir. 1982) (citations
omitted)).
19. See Anne M. Voigts, Narrowing the Eye of the Needle: Procedural Default,
Habeas Reform, and Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1103, 1126–29 (1999) (explaining why ineffective assistance of counsel claims, in
most circumstances, may only be practically raised in postconviction proceedings);
Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 689 (2007) (noting that
defendants claiming ineffective assistance of counsel are typically given a very brief
posttrial window in which to file a motion for relief from the judgment in the form of
a new trial). It is possible in most jurisdictions to raise ineffective assistance of
counsel claims in a motion for new trial proceeding, but this theoretical possibility is
not practical when trial counsel is representing the defendant during this type of
proceeding, and when time limits for bringing such claims are prohibitively short.
See Primus, Effective Trial Counsel, supra note 10, at 11 (noting that because an
attorney cannot be expected to raise the issue of her own ineffectiveness on appeal,
initial collateral proceedings represent the first practical opportunity defendants
have to raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim); Kornreich & Platt,
supra note 10, at 14–15 (positing that it is never ethically sound for an attorney to
bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim against herself, given that it is not in
the lawyer’s own interest and, accordingly, will interfere with her ethical obligation
to zealously advocate for her client).
20. Kovarsky, supra note 8; see also Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of
Teague Retroactivity, or “Redressability,” After Danforth v. Minnesota: Why Lower
Courts Should Give Retroactive Effect to New Constitutional Rules of Criminal
Procedure in Postconviction Proceedings, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 45 (2009)
Because appellate courts cannot find facts, claims that depend on
evidence outside the record on appeal cannot be raised; state
postconviction proceedings are usually initiated in a trial-level court
because the claims cognizable in postconviction proceedings are those
that require evidence outside the record, and findings of fact by the court
considering such evidence.
21. See Eve Brensike Primus, The Illusory Right to Counsel, 37 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 597, 609 (2011) (noting that it is very difficult, if not impossible, for a prison
inmate without counsel to gather extra-record evidence sufficient to establish
prejudice under the ineffective assistance of counsel standard); Smith
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given that the claims can usually only be brought in collateral
proceedings.22 Because states are only required to provide counsel
through an initial direct appeal,23 most defendants, and virtually
all noncapital defendants, have no lawyer to file postconviction
petitions in either state or federal court.24
As a practical matter, then, the current state of the law
ensures that the vast majority of convicted noncapital defendants
have no recourse to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims,
and thus no mechanism for vindicating the requirement that the
counsel Gideon provides be “effective.”25 It is different for most
capital defendants, who typically are provided counsel for state
and federal collateral proceedings.26 For capitally convicted
defendants, although the lack of a right to counsel impacts their
ability to challenge the effectiveness of postconviction counsel, it
does not work to deprive them of counsel altogether. So long as
noncapital defendants are not provided postconviction counsel,

& Starns, supra note 18, at 88–100 (establishing the many ways in which
indigent prisoners are ill-equipped to develop and raise claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel).
22. See Voigts, supra note 19, at 1127–28 (explaining why ineffective
assistance of counsel claims may generally not be brought on direct appeal);
Massaro, 538 U.S. at 508–09 (acknowledging that claims raising trial counsel’s
ineffectiveness in federal cases should typically be brought in postconviction
proceedings and will not be barred if raised in those proceedings for the first
time, even if they theoretically could have been raised on direct appeal).
23. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (“Our cases
establish that the right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right,
and no further.”); see also Primus, supra note 21, at 605–07 (noting that, while
defendants have a constitutional right to effective counsel on initial direct
appeal, that right does not extend to further appeals).
24. Arizona is an exception. The state provides postconviction counsel to all
indigent defendants convicted at trial. See ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 32.4(c).
25. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 18 n.3 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“The Court consistently has adhered to Justice Sutherland’s observation in
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53, 71 (1932), that when assistance of counsel is
required, that assistance must be ‘effective’ rather than ‘pro forma.’”).
26. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 918 (2012) (noting that Alabama
is “[n]early alone among the States” in that it does not “guarantee
representation to indigent capital defendants in postconviction proceedings”);
see infra note 174 (citing statute providing for counsel in capital federal habeas
proceedings).
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however, most violations of the fundamental right to counsel at
trial are likely to go unremedied.27
Although framed in limited terms, Martinez and Maples
have opened the door to challenging the existing framework,
making it appropriate to debate whether the right to effective
assistance of counsel at trial includes, as well, the right to raise
at least a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Gideon’s fiftieth anniversary provides an appropriate moment to
reconsider a famous right, as well as the remedy that proves
elusive for all but a handful of convicted defendants.
In this Article, I argue that, in Martinez and, to a lesser
extent, Maples, the Court has taken a step closer to recognizing
not necessarily a broad right to postconviction counsel but
rather a narrower yet critical right to raise a claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel in at least one forum. This is a right
already afforded, de facto, to most capital defendants but to very
few noncapital defendants. Framed as such, I suggest that
Martinez and Maples portend a legal landscape in which it is
possible to obtain a remedy for a Sixth Amendment violation
without extending the right to counsel to postconviction cases in
their entirety. While far from ideal, such a regime may be
somewhat more palatable to the current Court, thus rendering
visible—and actionable—violations of Gideon’s promise that are
not brought to light under the existing regime.
In Part II, I trace efforts over the past several decades to
establish a constitutional right to counsel in postconviction
proceedings. These efforts have been unsuccessful, and the
Court has rejected the entreaties.28 The Court has done so, however,
in a way that never quite foreclosed reconsideration. Such
27. I am deliberately excluding here a discussion of pro se prisoners filing
meritorious federal habeas petitions. While it is theoretically possible for
uncounseled prisoners to file such petitions (perhaps with respect to truly
record-based ineffectiveness claims), these cases are the rare exception. For
reasons discussed more fully infra, the ability to raise an ineffectiveness claim
pro se does not equate to a remedy in any meaningful way. See Primus, supra
note 21, at 608 (“Collecting the extra-record evidence to show that your trial
attorney was constitutionally ineffective is particularly difficult if you are in
custody and do not have the assistance of a lawyer. How are you supposed to
supplement the trial court record from inside a prison cell?” (citation omitted)).
28. See infra notes 72–92 and accompanying text (explaining the Supreme
Court’s refusal to recognize a constitutional right to postconviction counsel).
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reconsideration looked possible, if unlikely, when the Court
agreed to hear Martinez.
The Court decided Martinez just two months after it ruled
in Maples. Maples had headline-grabbing facts—involving the
colossal failure on the part of a major New York corporate law
firm to represent competently its pro bono client on death row in
Alabama—but was, at bottom, about when “cause” could be
established to excuse the failures of state-provided,
postconviction counsel to which a defendant is not
constitutionally entitled.29 In Maples, the Court held that, when
postconviction counsel abandons their client, the agency
relationship has been severed and the client can establish cause
to excuse a procedural default.30
When the Court agreed to review Martinez, some
commentators read the tea leaves to suggest a reconsideration of
the precedent holding that there was no constitutional right to
postconviction counsel.31 But it was not to be. The Court
explicitly avoided reaching a constitutional question about the
right to postconviction counsel, ruling instead in the exercise of
its equitable discretion that, as in Maples, under certain
circumstances, inadequate postconviction representation can
provide cause for the excusal of a procedural bar on federal
habeas review.32 Specifically, Martinez held that ineffective
assistance of postconviction counsel, or the lack of such counsel
altogether, can excuse the procedural default of an ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claim in federal court, at least in those
29. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 927; see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 72
(1977) (establishing that the rule barring federal habeas review will be excused
upon a showing of “cause” and “prejudice”).
30. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 1315.
31. See Hugh Mundy, Rid of Habeas Corpus? How Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel Has Endangered Access to the Writ of Habeas Corpus and What the
Supreme Court Can Do in Maples and Martinez to Restore It, 45 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 185, 212–13 (2011) (urging the Court to expand the right to counsel to
cover first postconviction proceedings to “increase the likelihood that important
constitutional claims reach federal courts without falling by the procedural
wayside”). But see Tom Zimpleman, The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Era, 63
S.C. L. REV. 425, 460 (2011) (expressing pessimism about the Court’s future
ruling in Martinez given its previous efforts to curtail review for defaulted
claims).
32. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318–19 (2012).
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states where the law requires the claim to be raised
postconviction.33 And once the default is excused, the door is
open to merits review of the ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claim.
While Martinez may have disappointed those hoping the
Court would establish a constitutional right to postconviction
counsel, it did upend what commentators and litigators had
assumed for years was settled law regarding the relevance of
postconviction counsel’s competence.34 And when coupled with
Maples, it opened up intriguing new possibilities for the future
of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in noncapital cases,
when defendants are typically without postconviction counsel.35
Most notably, the Court’s opinion in Martinez suggested that it
is as important to allow defendants an opportunity to pursue
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims as it is to allow
them to raise record-based trial errors typically brought by
constitutionally required appellate counsel. In the Court’s
words, “[a] prisoner’s inability to present a claim of trial error
33. Id. at 1320. As noted above, the Supreme Court is now considering its
first post-Martinez case. In this case, Trevino, the issue is whether, to put it as
bluntly as the Texas Attorney General did in urging the Supreme Court not to
grant review, Martinez “appl[ies] in Texas.” See Respondent’s Brief in
Opposition at 11–14, Trevino v. Thaler, 449 F. App’x 415 (5th Cir. 2011) (No. 1110189), 2012 WL 3555164. In its review of Trevino, the Court will consider
whether the Fifth Circuit was correct when it held that, because ineffectiveness
claims can technically be brought prior to postconviction in Texas, Martinez does
not apply in that state. See Ibarra v. Thaler, 687 F.3d 222, 225–27 (5th Cir.
2012) (refusing to apply Martinez in Texas). The Court’s ruling in Trevino
should have wide implications for the future scope of Martinez because the
majority of states do, at least in theory, allow for ineffective assistance of
counsel claims to be brought prior to postconviction review, even though such a
practice is neither encouraged nor facilitated through the provision of time and
resources. Eve Primus, who has exhaustively catalogued the state laws in this
regard, has concluded that “in most states,” the requirement that ineffectiveness
claims be brought in postconviction is “de facto rather than de jure.” Primus,
Effective Trial Counsel, supra note 10, at 6 n.33 (cataloguing state laws).
Trevino should shed light on whether the Court, in Martinez, intended to limit
its application to only the handful of states, such as Arizona, that require, de
jure, that ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims be raised postconviction.
34. King, supra note 8 (“Until today, it was no excuse that a prisoner had
no attorney (or only an incompetent attorney) in state collateral proceedings to
help him comply with state rules. After today’s decision, it is.”).
35. See infra notes 173–75 (discussing implications of Martinez and Maples
for noncapital defendants).
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is of particular concern when the claim is one of ineffective
assistance of counsel.”36
In Part III, I discuss in some detail the Court’s decisions in
both Martinez and Maples, and situate them within the
ineffectiveness jurisprudence. In each case, an indigent
prisoner found himself before the Supreme Court, arguing that
his postconviction counsel (to which he was not constitutionally
entitled) erred in a way that deprived the state and federal
habeas courts of an opportunity to review his claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.37 The Court could have
used these cases as vehicles to announce a new constitutional
right to counsel. Or it could have used them to further solidify
the rule of Coleman v. Thompson,38 which has long stood for
the proposition that the failures of postconviction counsel
cannot be the basis of relief when appointment of that counsel
was not constitutionally required.39
Instead, in a pair of 7–2 decisions with Justices Scalia and
Thomas dissenting in each, the Court declined to disturb the rule
of Coleman40 and reiterated the general rule that the failure of
postconviction counsel does not excuse a procedural default in
federal court41—but also, in each case, recognized an exception
36. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317 (emphasis added).
37. See id. 1314–15 (stating that Martinez believed his postconviction
attorney was ineffective because she had failed to raise an ineffectiveness of
trial counsel claim in his initial collateral proceeding); Maples v. Thomas, 132 S.
Ct. 912, 916–17 (2012) (outlining Maples’s argument that he should be
permitted to file his habeas petition after the filing deadline because he was
abandoned without notice by his out-of-state attorneys).
38. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
39. See id. at 752–54 (“There is no constitutional right to an attorney in
state post-conviction proceedings. . . . Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings.”).
40. See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320 (2012) (“The rule of
Coleman governs in all but the limited circumstances recognized here.”);
Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 922 (“[W]hen a petitioner’s postconviction attorney misses
a filing deadline, the petitioner is bound by that oversight and cannot rely on it
to establish cause. . . . We do not disturb that general rule.” (citing Coleman, 501
U.S. at 753–54)).
41. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320 (stating that an error on the part of
postconviction counsel generally does not excuse a procedural default); Maples,
132 S. Ct. at 922 (stating that postconviction counsel’s failure to meet a filing
deadline does not generally constitute cause for circumventing a procedural
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that excused the procedural default.42 Justice Scalia’s dissents
took the Court to task for reiterating settled law while
excusing the default in each case anyway with little regard, he
contended, for the precedent set for future cases.43
In Part IV, I take issue with the prevailing view of
commentators, which appears to be that Martinez erects a set
of procedural rules all but mandating states to provide
postconviction counsel, even in the absence of a constitutional
requirement.44 I have a somewhat different take. I am
skeptical that the equitable ruling in Martinez provides
sufficient incentive for states to provide postconviction counsel,
and the current Court does not seem poised to announce a
blanket constitutional right to postconviction counsel any time
soon. I think, rather, that the more lasting effect of the
decision may be the impact on the ability of noncapital
defendants to argue that counsel is required in order to litigate
the ineffectiveness of their trial counsel.
Martinez and Maples do not necessarily evidence the
Court’s concern that all defendants enjoy postconviction
counsel; instead, they reflect the Court’s unease with the
inability of defendants to raise, at least once, in some forum, a
claim that they were deprived of constitutionally effective trial
counsel. If the Court continues to attempt to remedy this
problem through equitable as opposed to constitutional rulings,
it is unlikely to provide much in the way of meaningful relief to
uncounseled, noncapital defendants. But the logic and
underlying concern the Court expressed in both cases does
bar).
42. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320 (stating that the rule announced is an
exception to Coleman); Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 927 (2012) (justifying
the holding based on the “extraordinary circumstances” of the case).
43. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1327 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Despite the
Court’s protestations to the contrary, the decision is a radical alteration of our
habeas jurisprudence that will impose considerable economic costs on the States
and further impair their ability to provide justice in a timely fashion.”); Maples,
132 S. Ct. at 934 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]f the interest of fairness justifies our
excusing Maples’ procedural default here, it does so whenever a defendant’s
procedural default is caused by his attorney. That is simply not the law—and
cannot be, if the states are to have an orderly system of criminal litigation
conducted by counsel.”).
44. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
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portend the eventual recognition of a constitutional right, not
necessarily to postconviction counsel generally, but to counsel
who can raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in at
least one forum.45
I argue that Martinez and Maples are, then, less about the
right to counsel in postconviction proceedings and more about the
right to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.46 This is
a subtle distinction, but one that represents the triumph of
Justice Kennedy’s view—first expressed in his concurrence in
Murray v. Giarratano,47 that postconviction is a critical stage in
the criminal process in most states because it is the first real
opportunity to present an ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claim—over Justice Rehnquist’s view of postconviction as an
insignificant appendage to the appellate process. Martinez and
Maples are decisions that have been (cautiously) celebrated by
the capital defense bar but may actually have a more lasting
effect on noncapital defendants because it is noncapital
defendants who are typically unable to raise ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claims at any time.
While Martinez and Maples themselves admit only of narrow
exceptions to the procedural default rule in federal court, they
suggest a framing in future cases that focuses more on the right
to bring an ineffectiveness claim derived directly from the Gideon
45. See infra Part IV.B.
46. Much has been written about the right to counsel (or lack thereof) in
postconviction proceedings, but the question is almost never framed in terms of
a right to litigate an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. One exception
is Kirk J. Henderson, The Right to Argue that Trial Counsel Was
Constitutionally Ineffective, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (2006). This Article is a detailed
account of Pennsylvania law on the right to raise ineffectiveness claims, and it
makes a number of policy proposals specifically related to defendants in
Pennsylvania who receive short prison sentences. Id. at 32–45. In the course of
making these proposals, Henderson argues that “the right to counsel is the
keystone right enjoyed by a criminal defendant and . . . a defendant, thus, must
be given an opportunity to vindicate the deprivation of that right.” Id. at 20.
47. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 14 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“It cannot be denied that collateral relief proceedings are a central part of the
review process for prisoners sentenced to death.”); see also id. at 25 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“The postconviction procedure in Virginia may present the first
opportunity for an attorney detached from past proceedings to examine the
defense and to raise claims that were barred on direct review by prior counsel’s
ineffective assistance.”).
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right itself, as opposed to a right to secure postconviction counsel
writ large.48 Votes apparently did not exist on the currently
constituted Court for such an expansion of the right to counsel in
Martinez. As a result, the immediate impact of Martinez and
Maples, especially for noncapital defendants who are unlikely to
secure federal habeas counsel, is minimal. But the logic of the
cases is inescapable: for the bedrock principle of Gideon to
provide meaningful protection to the indigent-accused, counsel
must be afforded to allow for the presentation of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claims.
II. The Elusive Right to Postconviction Counsel
This year also marks the fiftieth anniversary of Douglas v.
California,49 which was decided the same day as Gideon. In
Douglas, the Court held that states must provide counsel to
indigent defendants for their “first appeal, granted as a matter of
right.”50 The decision, written by Justice Douglas, appears to be
grounded in both due process and equal protection principles,
with an emphasis on the latter: “[W]here the merits of the one
and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without
benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been
drawn between rich and poor.”51 Douglas did not create a right to
appeal, but it does stand for the proposition that when states
choose to grant criminal defendants a right to appeal, they must
provide counsel as well.52
48. See discussion infra Part IV.B (suggesting a right to pursue an
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim).
49. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
50. Id. at 366.
51. Id. at 357; see Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608–09 (1974) (noting that
it is not clear whether Douglas was grounded in equal protection or due process
principles); id. at 621 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Douglas v. California was
grounded on concepts of fairness and equality.”). In Halbert v. Michigan, the
Court observed that its cases on “appeal barriers encountered by persons unable
to pay their own way” were grounded generally in both equal protection and due
process concerns. 545 U.S. 605, 610 (2005).
52. See McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894) (“A review by an
appellate court of the final judgment in a criminal case, however grave the
offense of which the accused is convicted, was not at common law, and is not
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Douglas represented the high-water mark with respect to the
Court’s extension of the right to counsel in criminal proceedings. A
series of cases, beginning with Ross v. Moffitt53 in 1974 and
concluding with Coleman v. Thompson in 1991, held that the
Constitution generally does not require states to provide counsel
beyond the first appeal as of right.54
Ross considered whether Douglas should be extended to
discretionary state appeals and to applications for review in the
Supreme Court.55 In an opinion written by then-Justice Rehnquist,
the Court held that neither the Due Process Clause nor the Equal
Protection Clause requires states to provide counsel beyond the
first appeal as of right.56 With respect to due process, the Court
emphasized the differences between the trial and appellate stages
of a criminal proceeding. Regarding appeal, the Court noted:
[I]t is ordinarily the defendant, rather than the State, who
initiates the appellate process, seeking not to fend off the efforts
of the State’s prosecutor but rather to overturn a finding of guilt
made by a judge or a jury below. The defendant needs an
attorney on appeal not as a shield to protect him against being
“haled into court” by the State and stripped of his presumption
of innocence, but rather as a sword to upset the prior
determination of guilt.57

Because the right to an appeal is not constitutionally guaranteed,
the Court held, there can be no violation of due process when the
state refuses to provide counsel “at every stage” of the appellate

now, a necessary element of due process of law.”); see also Murray v. Giarratano,
492 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing McKane and describing
the holding of Douglas); Ross, 417 U.S. at 606 (citing McKane and noting the
“traditional principle that a State is not obliged to provide any appeal at all for
criminal defendants”).
53. Ross, 417 U.S. at 600.
54. See id. at 612 (“[W]e do not believe that the Equal Protection Clause . . .
requires North Carolina to provide free counsel for indigent defendants seeking
to take discretionary appeals to the North Carolina Supreme Court, or to file
petitions for certiorari in this Court.”); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752
(1991) (“There is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction
proceedings.”).
55. Ross, 417 U.S. at 600.
56. Id. at 609–16.
57. Id. at 610.
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process.58 The Court, implicitly recognizing that this reasoning
could just as easily govern the question presented in Douglas,
then moved on to analyze the claim under an equal protection
analysis.59
With respect to equal protection, the Court concluded that an
uncounseled, indigent defendant seeking discretionary review in
a state’s highest court, when he has received counsel for his first
appeal as of right (to the state’s intermediate appellate court), is
not so much worse off than a defendant with the resources to hire
appellate counsel.60 After all, the Court noted, the indigent
defendant might not have a lawyer, but he will have at his
disposal “a transcript or other record of the trial proceedings, a
brief on his behalf filed in the Court of Appeals setting forth his
claims of error, and in many cases an opinion by the Court of
Appeals disposing of his case.”61 This material, along with
whatever the indigent defendant can come up with on his own,
provides the state supreme court “with an adequate basis for its
decision to grant or deny review.”62
Justice Rehnquist had become Chief Justice by the time the
Court decided Pennsylvania v. Finley63 in 1987, and he wrote the
opinion for the Court in that case as well. At its most narrow
reading, Finley, a noncapital case, was about whether the
procedures dictated in Anders v. California64 had to be followed in
state postconviction proceedings.65 To answer that question,
58. Id. at 611.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 616
This is not to say that a skilled lawyer . . . would not prove helpful
to any litigant able to employ him. . . . But both the opportunity to
have counsel prepare an initial brief in the Court of Appeals and the
nature of discretionary review in the [state supreme court] make
this relative handicap far less.
61. Id. at 615.
62. Id. The Court did not discuss the possibility that an indigent
defendant’s need for counsel would be significantly greater if the state
supreme court decided to grant review.
63. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
64. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
65. See Finley, 481 U.S. at 554 (“We think that the court below
improperly . . . extend[ed] the Anders procedures to postconviction proceedings.”).
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however, the Court felt obligated to first discuss whether indigent
defendants had a constitutional right to counsel in state
postconviction proceedings.66 If not, then the Anders procedures
would not apply.67 The Court made quick work of the suggestion
that there is a constitutional right to postconviction counsel,
noting that because Ross foreclosed the possibility of a
constitutional right to counsel for discretionary appeals, there
could be no such right “when attacking a conviction that has long
since become final upon exhaustion of the appellate process.”68
Indeed, the Court held, “Postconviction relief is even further
removed from the criminal trial than is discretionary direct
review.”69 Thus, the Court concluded, while Pennsylvania had
made the “valid choice” to provide postconviction counsel, it was
not constitutionally required to have done so.70 And because it
was not constitutionally required to provide counsel, it could not
be required to follow the Anders procedures when it elected to
provide counsel: “[T]he Constitution does not put the State to the
difficult choice between affording no counsel whatsoever or
following the strict procedural guidelines enunciated in Anders.”71
Two years after Finley, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for a
four-Justice plurality in Murray v. Giarratano,72 a federal civil
rights action alleging a constitutional right to postconviction
counsel in capital cases. Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Finley for
the proposition that the Constitution does not require “the State
to appoint counsel for indigent prisoners seeking state
postconviction relief.”73 The question for the Court in Giarratano,
however, was whether the fact that a case was capital dictated a
different result.74 “No,” said the plurality, holding that “the rule
Anders announced procedures for appointed appellate counsel to follow if
counsel believes no colorable appellate claims exist. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.
66. Finley, 481 U.S. at 555.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 556–57.
70. Id. at 559.
71. Id.
72. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
73. Id. at 7.
74. Id. at 4–6.
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of Pennsylvania v. Finley should apply no differently in capital
cases than in noncapital cases.”75 Noting again the belief that
postconviction proceedings “serve a different and more limited
purpose than either the trial or appeal,” the Rehnquist plurality
was satisfied that the Eighth Amendment protections afforded to
capital defendants at trial were sufficient to “assure the
reliability of the process by which the death penalty is imposed.”76
Justice Kennedy did not join the plurality opinion in
Giarratano, but he provided the fifth vote against the petitioner
class of Virginia death row inmates.77 And though his vote sealed
the fate of the petitioners in Giarratano, his concurring opinion in
the case struck a remarkably different tone with respect to the
role of postconviction in our system. It did so in a way that
foreshadowed Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in
Martinez more than two decades later.
Justice Kennedy began his concurring opinion, which Justice
O’Connor joined, by stating, “It cannot be denied that collateral
relief proceedings are a central part of the review process for
prisoners sentenced to death.”78 He noted the substantial success
rate of collateral attacks in capital cases,79 and also commented
that, at least in death penalty cases, defendants required the
assistance of counsel to meaningfully litigate in collateral
proceedings: “The complexity of our jurisprudence in this area,
moreover, makes it unlikely that capital defendants will be able
to file successful petitions for collateral relief without the
assistance of persons learned in the law.”80 Justice Kennedy was
operating from a very different premise than that of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, who, as noted above, relegated the postconviction
process to insignificant status in the context of the overall
proceedings in a criminal case.81
75. Id. at 10.
76. Id.; see also id. at 13 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]here is nothing in
the Constitution or the precedents of this Court that requires that a State
provide counsel in postconviction proceedings.”).
77. Id. at 14 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 9 (“[D]irect appeal is the primary avenue for review of a
conviction or sentence, and death penalty cases are no exception.” (quoting
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Justice Kennedy concluded that, because the record revealed
that “no prisoner on death row in Virginia has been unable to
obtain counsel to represent him in postconviction proceedings,” he
was “not prepared” to say that Virginia’s postconviction scheme
violated the Constitution.82 His concurrence was explicitly based
“[o]n the facts and record of this case.”83 But his deciding fifth
vote implies that he believed that the Constitution does provide
some meaningful access to postconviction counsel, at least in
capital cases.84 As Eric Freedman has argued, “Contrary to much
loose talk, Giarratano did not decide that there is no right to
counsel in state postconviction proceedings in capital cases.”85
Rather, Freedman points out, “Giarratano only rejected the claim
of constitutional entitlement in that particular instance.”86
At issue two years after Giarratano, in Coleman v.
Thompson, was counsel’s failure, on appeal from the trial court’s
denial of the state postconviction petition, to file a timely notice of
appeal.87 Coleman alleged that his postconviction counsel’s
ineffective assistance—the failure of his pro bono law firm to file
the notice of appeal on time—was sufficient “cause” for the
procedural default in state court and he should be permitted to
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983))).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See Eric M. Freedman, Giarratano Is a Scarecrow: The Right to Counsel
in State Capital Postconviction Proceedings, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1079, 1086
(2006) (arguing that “five, and perhaps six Justices [in Giarratano] plainly
believed that states” had a constitutional obligation to provide postconviction
counsel to death row inmates).
85. Id. at 1089; see also Smith & Starns, supra note 18, at 57–58 (“[I]n
Murray v. Giarratano, four members of the Supreme Court opined that there
was no constitutional right to the assistance of counsel in post-conviction
proceedings, even in a capital case. The key to the case, however, was in the
concurrences . . . .” (citations omitted)).
86. Freedman, supra note 84, at 1089; see also Smith & Starns, supra note
18, at 57–58 (noting that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Giarratano was
limited only to the specific facts of the case). Freedman suggests that
Giarratano “implicitly held that other facts would lead to other results.”
Freedman, supra note 84, at 1089. At the very least, Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence does not foreclose the possibility of a different result on different
facts.
87. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) (outlining Coleman’s
claim that his attorney’s error should excuse the procedural default).
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pursue federal habeas relief.88 Thus, the Court was called to
determine whether Coleman, a death row inmate, had a right to
counsel at that stage. If so, ineffective assistance could be
grounds for “cause” to excuse the default; if not, it could not.89
In Coleman, the Court announced that “[t]here is no
constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction
proceedings.”90 Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court cited
both Finley and Giarratano summarily for this proposition91 and
concluded that, “[b]ecause Coleman had no right to counsel to
pursue his appeal in state habeas, any attorney error that led to
the default of Coleman’s claims in state court cannot constitute
cause to excuse his default in federal habeas.”92
The Court in Coleman explicitly left open the question
whether there should be an “exception” to the rule of Finley and
Giarratano “in those cases where state collateral review is the
first place a prisoner can present a challenge to his conviction.”93
The Court did not need to reach the question because Coleman
did have one court review his state habeas claims—the state trial
court.94
In sum, before last Term, the Supreme Court had never
assigned any relevance to the quality of postconviction counsel,
even in capital cases.95 It was something of a surprise, then, when
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.; see also id. at 755 (“Finley and Giarratano established that there is
no right to counsel in state collateral proceedings.”).
92. Id. at 757.
93. Id. at 755.
94. Id.
95. See Freedman, supra note 84, at 1080 n.11 (referring to Coleman as
“‘intellectually and practically’ untenable . . . [as well as] ‘morally indefensible’”
(quoting Eric M. Freedman, Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, in
AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 553, 568 (James R. Acker et
al. eds., 2d ed. 2003))); see also Celestine Richards McConville, Protecting the
Right to Effective Assistance of Capital Post-Conviction Counsel: The Scope of
Constitutional Obligation to Monitor Counsel Performance, 66 U. PITT. L. REV.
521, 524–25 (2005) (describing how the Court has consistently declined to
establish a right to postconviction counsel or even extend constitutional
ineffective assistance of counsel to statutory grants of postconviction counsel). In
Halbert v. Michigan, the Court did hold that defendants were entitled to counsel
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the Court chose to address, in Martinez and Maples, the
implications in those cases of postconviction counsel’s inadequate
performance.
III. Martinez and Maples
Cory Maples, an indigent Alabama death row inmate, may
have thought he had “won the lottery.”96 Like Roger Coleman
years before him,97 a high-powered corporate law firm had
agreed to represent him in his postconviction proceedings.98 As
for a discretionary postconviction appeal from a plea bargain under Michigan’s
unique direct appeals process. 545 U.S. 605, 609 (2005). Indeed, that 6–3
opinion, which Justice Kennedy joined, may have further contributed to the
foundation of the Martinez ruling because it appeared grounded in a concern
that plea-convicted defendants have at least one counseled opportunity to
present their claims. Id. at 619; see also Steve Vladeck, Martinez v. Ryan
Argument Preview: Direct Vs. Collateral Review and the Theory Behind the
Right to Counsel, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 29, 2011, 12:16 PM), http://www.
scotusblog.com/2011/09/martinez-v-ryan-argument-preview-direct-vs-collateralreview-and-the-theory-behind-the-right-to-counsel/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013)
(noting, in a pre-Martinez blog post, that Halbert stands for the proposition that
“the purpose of the right to counsel is to allow defendants fully to litigate the
merits of viable claims at least once, particularly when a pro se defendant would
be ill-equipped to do so on his own”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
96. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 928 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring)
(“I have little doubt that the vast majority of criminal defendants would think
that they had won the lottery if they were given the opportunity to be
represented by attorneys from such a firm.”).
97. Roger Coleman was represented by the prominent D.C. law firm of
Arnold and Porter. Lawyers at the firm misunderstood the filing deadlines for
the notice of appeal and missed the deadline to file an appeal from the trial
court’s denial of postconviction relief. JOHN C. TUCKER, MAY GOD HAVE MERCY
115 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1997) (“On December 4, 1986, Arnold & Porter filed
Coleman’s brief on appeal with the Virginia Supreme Court. On December 9 the
state moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the notice of appeal had
been filed a day late.”).
98. See Adam Liptak, A Mailroom Mix-up That Could Cost a Life, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 2, 2010, at A10 (“Cory R. Maples, a death row inmate in Alabama,
must have been grateful when lawyers from the firm agreed to represent him
without charge.”); Adam Liptak, An Appeal Gone Astray Catches the Supreme
Court’s Attention, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2011 (“Cory R. Maples, a death row inmate
in Alabama, had what turned out to be the bad fortune to be represented by one
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the Supreme Court would go on to observe in its opinion in his
case, Alabama, unlike almost all other states, does not
guarantee counsel to death row inmates seeking to challenge
their convictions and death sentences in collateral
proceedings.99 Instead, indigent death row inmates must
petition non-profit organizations, law school clinics, or law
firms to take their cases pro bono.100 Some are unable to find
lawyers and remain without counsel as their time limits for
filing habeas petitions wind down.101 So Maples was
presumably fortunate to have secured postconviction counsel.
Maples’s pro bono postconviction attorneys, however, failed
him. After filing a state postconviction petition raising claims
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the two Sullivan &
Cromwell attorneys, Jaasi Munanka and Clara Ingen-Housz,
left the firm without notifying either their client or the circuit
court in which the petition was pending.102 When the circuit
court denied relief in the case and sent the final order to the
law firm, the order was returned to the court clerk, who did
of the most prominent law firms in the nation.”).
99. See Freedman, supra note 84, at 1081 (“Notably, every active death
penalty state today, with the exception of Alabama, provides for the prefiling
appointment of counsel to assist with indigent death row inmates in the
preparation of postconviction petitions challenging their convictions and
sentences.”).
100. See id. at 1090 (“Alabama prisoners are at the mercy of whatever pro
bono assistance they can scrape together and their own pro se efforts.”). Full
disclosure: I teach in a law school clinic that represents clients on death row,
including several in Alabama.
101. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 918 (2012) (“‘[A]s of April 2006,
approximately fifteen of Alabama’s death row inmates in the final rounds of
state appeals had no lawyer to represent them.’” (quoting AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY
SYSTEMS: THE ALABAMA DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT 112 (2006))).
102. Id. at 916. An attorney for Mr. Munanka has disputed the accuracy of
the facts that have been repeated in multiple media accounts and the Supreme
Court opinion in Maples. See John Steele, Lawyer in Maples v. Thomas Case
Asks Ethics Professors and Practitioners To Correct Their Claims, LEGAL ETHICS
FORUM (Jan. 22, 2013, 10:12 AM), http://www.legalethicsforum.com/blog/2013/
01/lawyer-in-maples-v-thomas-case-asks-ethics-professors-and-practitioners-tocorrect-their-.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review). However, neither Munanka nor Ingen-Housz has provided a
public account of the facts that differs from that presented in the Court’s ruling.
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nothing further to track down Maples’s attorneys.103 As a result,
the forty-two days that Maples had to file a notice of appeal in the
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals lapsed before Maples even
learned the circuit court had denied his postconviction petition.104
When Maples was finally alerted to what had happened (via
a letter from the Assistant Attorney General on the case), he
called his mother, who placed what must have been a frantic call
to the New York firm.105 New counsel at the firm tried to rectify
the mistake first by seeking an out-of-time appeal, which was
denied, and then by filing a federal habeas petition raising the
same ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims that the
Alabama circuit court had denied.106
The lower federal courts held that Maples’s ineffectiveness
claims were procedurally barred because he had missed the state
deadline for filing a notice of appeal.107 The fact that it was
postconviction counsel who were entirely at fault did not move
these courts, which read Coleman v. Thompson to preclude any
excuse based on the actions of counsel to which the defendant
was not constitutionally entitled.108
The Supreme Court granted review “to decide whether the
uncommon facts presented here establish cause adequate to
excuse Maples’s procedural default.”109 Although it ultimately
103. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 917.
104. See id. at 918–20 (providing the factual and procedural history).
105. Jon Hayden, the assistant attorney general who wrote to Maples,
informed Maples that he had only a few weeks to file a federal habeas corpus
petition before his statute of limitations for doing so expired. Id. at 920.
Although Hayden sent Maples the letter prior to the expiration of the federal
habeas statute, he sent it after the forty-two days to file a notice of appeal in
state court had come and gone. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 917.
108. See Maples v. Allen, 586 F.3d 879, 891 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Here, the
factor that resulted in Maples’ default—namely, counsel’s failure to file a timely
notice of appeal of the Rule 32 Order—cannot establish cause for his default
because there is no right to post-conviction counsel.” (citing Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991))).
109. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. at 922. While the facts of Maples were
egregious, they are not shocking to those familiar with postconviction practice in
Alabama death penalty cases. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Lawyers Stumble, and
Clients Take Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2013, at A12 (describing the case of
Alabama death row inmate Ronald B. Smith, whose postconviction attorney was
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granted relief to Maples, the Court took pains to note that it was
doing nothing to “disturb [the] general rule” of Coleman that
“[n]egligence on the part of a prisoner’s postconviction attorney
does not qualify as ‘cause.’”110 Instead, the facts of Maples
represented a “markedly different situation” in which “an
attorney abandon[ed] his client without notice.”111 Under those
circumstances, the attorney has severed the attorney–client
relationship, and the agency principles that typically work to
impute the attorney’s negligence to the client are not
applicable.112 When the prisoner has been “disarmed by
extraordinary circumstances quite beyond his control,” he has
demonstrated sufficient cause, the Court held, to excuse the
procedural default.113

“battling a crippling drug addiction” at the time he missed a filing deadline that
threatened to foreclose all federal review of Smith’s constitutional claims);
Smith v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 703 F.3d 1266, 1267–68 (11th Cir. 2012)
(rejecting Smith’s request for equitable tolling in light of the failures of his
postconviction counsel); id. at 1276 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“These allegations
are sufficient to show an egregious breach of [postconviction counsel’s]
professional ethical obligations to Smith, which, I believe, constitute the sort of
extraordinary circumstances that merit equitable relief . . . .”).
110. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 122.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 922–23 (“Having severed the principal–agent relationship, an
attorney no longer acts, or fails to act, as the client’s representative.”). Judge
Barkett on the Eleventh Circuit has written a thorough refutation of the
applicability, generally, of the agency analogy in the context of death row
inmates and their attorneys. See Hutchinson v. Florida, 677 F.3d 1097, 1103–11
(11th Cir. 2012) (Barkett, J., concurring) (explaining why “none of the key
assumptions underlying the application of an agency relationship to a deathsentenced client and his lawyer are valid in the post-conviction context”).
113. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 927. The Court remanded for a consideration of
whether Maples had met the “prejudice” requirement to lift the bar to federal
review of his ineffectiveness claims. See id. at 927–28 (“Having found no cause
to excuse the failure to file a timely notice of appeal in state court, the District
Court and the Eleventh Circuit did not reach the question of prejudice. That
issue, therefore, remains open for decision on remand.” (citations omitted)). As a
practical matter, this inquiry entails a review of the merits of his ineffectiveness
claims; if they have merit, Maples should overcome the procedural bar and then
win relief in the form of a new trial, upon federal review of his clams.
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Justice Scalia, in dissent, dismissed the majority’s opinion as
merely “word games” that had now established a template for
habeas petitioners to use to get around the settled rule of
Coleman.114 The rhetoric of Justice Scalia’s dissent was tempered
somewhat by his recognition that the “interest of fairness,” at
first blush, would seem to justify the result in this case, given the
egregious facts and the State’s refusal to waive the procedural
default.115 But, he pointed out, the precedent established in the
postconviction context simply does not allow for an excusal of
procedural default “whenever a defendant’s procedural default is
caused by his attorney.”116 Maples, he contended, “invites future
evisceration of the principle that defendants are responsible for
the mistakes of their attorneys.”117
In Maples, Justice Scalia was concerned that habeas
petitioners facing procedural default would simply allege that
their ineffective postconviction counsel were not acting as
“genuinely representative agents” in order to position themselves
within the Maples exception.118 Given the extreme facts in Maples
and the narrow definition of “abandonment” the Court
employed,119 it is doubtful that the “template” Justice Scalia
feared will aid a significant number of habeas petitioners. In
Martinez v. Ryan,120 however, decided two months later, the

114. Id. at 933 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 934.
116. Id.
117. Id. Of course, this principle only holds in the postconviction context.
Defendants are not responsible for the mistakes of their attorneys in
proceedings during which they have a constitutional right to counsel. See, e.g.,
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (“[I]f the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left
to the mercies of incompetent counsel . . . .”).
118. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 933 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
119. See id. at 917 (majority opinion) (describing the abandonment as
“without leave of court, without informing Maples [that the attorneys] could no
longer represent him, and without securing substitution of counsel”); see also id.
at 923 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (likening Maples’s situation to a previous case
involving abandoning counsel when there was a “near-total failure to
communicate . . . or to respond to . . . inquiries and requests” (quoting Holland v.
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2568 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring))).
120. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
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Court created another exception to the procedural default rule,
one that may not be as easily cabined.
Luis Martinez was serving two consecutive life sentences in
Arizona as a result of his convictions for sexual conduct with a
minor following a jury trial.121 His state-appointed appellate
attorney filed a brief on direct appeal, which was denied.122 The
attorney did not raise any claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel because Arizona law does not allow such claims to be
raised on direct appeal.123 The appointed appellate counsel also
filed a petition for postconviction review in the state trial court.124
She did not raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim in
that petition either, and the petition was eventually dismissed on
the merits.125
Martinez was not entitled under either state or federal law to
new postconviction counsel, but he was able to secure new, pro
bono counsel anyway.126 New counsel filed a second petition for
postconviction relief, this time raising a number of claims
alleging that his trial counsel had performed ineffectively.127 The
Arizona courts, however, held these claims procedurally barred
because they could have been, but were not, raised in the first
postconviction petition.128
121. Id. at 1313.
122. Id. at 1314.
123. See id. (“Arizona law, however, did not permit her to argue on direct
appeal that trial counsel was ineffective.” (citing State v. Spreitz, 39 P.3d 525,
527 (Ariz. 2002))).
124. Id.
125. See id. (“Despite initiating this proceeding, counsel made no claim trial
counsel was ineffective and later filed a statement asserting she could find no
colorable claims at all.”).
126. See id. (“About a year and a half later, Martinez, now represented by
new counsel, filed a second notice of postconviction relief in the Arizona trial
court.”). Martinez was able to secure new postconviction counsel when the
Arizona Justice Project, a nonprofit organization that investigates claims of
manifest injustice, became interested in whether Martinez was factually
innocent or had received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. E-mail from
Professor Robert Bartels to Professor Ty Alper (Mar. 14, 2013, 10:42 PDT) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
127. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1314 (2012).
128. See id. (“Martinez’s petition was dismissed, in part in reliance on an
Arizona Rule barring relief on a claim that could have been raised in a previous
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When Martinez sought review of his ineffective assistance of
trial counsel claims in federal court, he was met with
longstanding case law that precludes federal review of claims
that have been procedurally barred pursuant to independent and
adequate state rules.129 He attempted to argue that his initial
appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness (the failure to raise trial
counsel’s ineffectiveness in the first postconviction petition)
constituted “cause” to excuse the procedural default.130 But there
he ran square into Coleman v. Thompson, or at least the lower
federal courts thought so. His claim was rejected first by the
District Court,131 and then by the Ninth Circuit, which noted that
Martinez had no constitutional right to postconviction counsel.132
Thus, per Coleman, “[w]ithout a right to the appointment of
counsel, there can be no right to the effective assistance of
counsel.”133
On petition for review in the Supreme Court, the case
presented the Court an opportunity to address the constitutional
question of whether “a prisoner has a right to effective counsel in
collateral proceedings which provide the first occasion to raise a
claim of ineffective assistance at trial.”134 The Court dubbed these
collateral proceeding. Martinez, the theory went, should have asserted the
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his first notice for
postconviction relief.”).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1314–15.
131. Martinez v. Schriro, No. CV 08-785-PHX-JAT, 2008 WL 5220909, at
*4–5 (D. Ariz. 2008), aff’d, 623 F.3d 731 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d sub nom.,
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. 1309.
132. See Martinez v. Schriro, 623 F.3d 731, 743 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d sub
nom., Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) (“We have already concluded
that there is no right to the assistance of post-conviction counsel in connection
with a state petition for post-conviction relief, such as Martinez asserts in this
case.”).
133. Id.
134. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315. The actual question presented in the
petition for certiorari was as follows:
Whether a defendant in a state criminal case who is prohibited by
state law from raising on direct appeal any claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel, but who has a state-law right to raise such
a claim in a first post-conviction proceeding, has a federal
constitutional right to effective assistance of first post-conviction
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proceedings “initial-review collateral proceedings.”135 Whether a
prisoner has a constitutional right to counsel in initial-review
collateral proceedings was the question explicitly left open in
Coleman more than two decades earlier,136 and it suggested that
the Court might at least mandate appointment of counsel in some
postconviction circumstances.
The Court, however, punted on this issue: “This is not the
case,” the Court said, to resolve the constitutional question left
unresolved in Coleman.137 The Court did not explain why
Martinez would not have been an appropriate vehicle for
answering the question; instead, it simply reframed the question
as whether ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel may
provide cause to excuse a procedural default in federal habeas
review, which is an equitable, as opposed to constitutional,
determination.138
counsel specifically with respect to his ineffective-assistance-of-trialcounsel claim.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, Martinez v. Schriro, cert granted sub nom.,
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (No. 10-1001), 2011 WL 398287.
135. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315.
136. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755 (1991) (“For Coleman to
prevail, therefore, there must be an exception to the rule of Finley and
Giarratano in those cases where state collateral review is the first place a
prisoner can present a challenge to his conviction. We need not answer this
question broadly . . . .”).
137. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012).
138. Id. at 1315 (“The precise question here is whether ineffective assistance
in an initial-review collateral proceeding on a claim of ineffective assistance at
trial may provide cause for a procedural default in a federal habeas
proceeding.”). In so doing, the Court made no mention of a provision in the
federal habeas statute that purports to rule out the adequacy of postconviction
counsel as a ground for relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (2012) (“The
ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral
post-conviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding
arising under section 2254.”). To be sure, Martinez was arguing that the
ineffectiveness of postconviction counsel should excuse the default in federal
court, not create an independent ground for relief. See Reply Brief at 13,
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (No. 10-1001), 2011 WL 4500686. But Arizona had
argued that such a result would provide “an end run around Section 2254(i).”
See Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 8, Martinez, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (No. 101001), 2011 WL 3947554. In any event, the Court did not address this concern in
its opinion.
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The Court’s 7–2 ruling in Martinez, written by Justice
Kennedy, created an equitable exception to the rule of Coleman. It
did so explicitly to “protect prisoners with a potentially legitimate
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.”139 Specifically, the
Court held that, when counsel performs ineffectively in initialreview collateral proceedings or a state fails to provide
postconviction counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings, the
petitioner might be able to establish cause for any procedural
default in federal court.140 If he can do so and can also demonstrate
that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim has “some merit,”
the default will be excused and the federal court will be permitted
to review the ineffective assistance of counsel claims fully on the
merits.141
The ruling in Martinez raises a host of questions about future
application.142 In his dissent, which was joined only by Justice
Thomas, Justice Scalia mocked the Court both for creating an
exception to the rule of Coleman that had, he argued, precisely the
same effect as if the Court had overturned Coleman,143 and for
139. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315.
140. Id. at 1320–21
Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a
procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a
substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initialreview collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that
proceeding was ineffective.
141. Id. at 1318–19. What the Court meant by “some merit” is an open
question. See King, supra note 10, at 11 (arguing that it “remains to be seen how
often the analysis of whether an ineffectiveness claim has ‘some merit’ or the
analysis of whether post-conviction counsel was ineffective will force a court to
conduct the very same merits review the default defense is supposed to
preclude”).
142. See, e.g., Freedman, Enforcing the ABA Guidelines, supra note 10
(arguing that “the equitable rationale of Martinez should apply to a number of
claims other than ineffective assistance of counsel”); see also King, supra note
10, at 3–5 (arguing that the question of whether a proceeding constituted an
“initial review proceeding” was not defined by the Court, and under “Martinez
might require a case- and even fact-specific analysis”); id. at 12 (arguing that
“[i]t is not clear how Martinez would be applied in cases involving petitioners
who do not want the legal representation that a state may offer for initial review
collateral proceedings”).
143. Id. at 1321 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Instead of [holding that there is a
constitutional right to counsel in initial-review state habeas], the Court holds
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suggesting that its ruling was merely a narrow advancement in
the law.144 Where Justice Scalia decried the Court’s “word games”
in Maples, here he was less constrained: “[T]he Court creates a
monstrosity.”145
IV. Toward a Right to Litigate Ineffectiveness
A. Evolution from Rehnquist to Kennedy
Some scholars have read Martinez and Maples as
establishing a strong incentive for states to provide
postconviction counsel.146 My view is that the opinions portend a
different advancement in the law, one that, if realized, would also
be of significant benefit to tens of thousands of prisoners serving
noncapital sentences. With respect to the blanket provision of
postconviction counsel, however, I am less sanguine; my reading
is that neither case provides much incentive for states to provide
postconviction counsel.
Indeed, Justice Scalia’s concern that Martinez “as a practical
matter requires States to appoint counsel in initial-review
collateral proceedings” seems wildly exaggerated.147 Because
that, for equitable reasons, . . . failing to provide assistance of counsel . . .
constitutes cause for excusing procedural default. The result, of course, is
precisely the same.”).
144. Id. at 1321–22 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s soothing assertion
that its holding addresses only the constitutional claims presented in this case
insults the reader’s intelligence.” (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted)).
145. Id. at 1327 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
146. See Shay, supra note 10, at 3 (“Maples and Martinez provide incentive
for states to provide effective assistance of counsel in state postconviction at a
moment when these proceedings are being forced to assume a new role in the
development of federal constitutional procedure.”); id. at 12 (“Martinez creates
powerful incentives for states to ensure competent counsel in state
postconviction.”); Primus, Effective Trial Counsel, supra note 10, at 8–9
(describing the suggestion that Justice Scalia’s predictions are overstated as
potentially “misguided”). Eric Freedman has predicted that, in the wake of
Martinez, “states will decide that their only reasonable choice is to provide
effective counsel,” but he acknowledges the incentive may only exist in capital
cases. Freedman, Enforcing the ABA Guidelines, supra note 10, at 102, 104. I
am grateful to Giovanna Shay and Eric Freedman for providing me with
unpublished drafts of their essays.
147. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1327 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Martinez provides cause to avoid a default, it only “requires”
appointment of postconviction counsel to the extent that states
want to use procedural default to avoid merits review in federal
court.148 Martinez comes into play only when a state prisoner files
a federal habeas petition alleging an ineffectiveness claim that
appears to contain “some merit.”149 For that to happen, the
prisoner, in almost all cases, needs a lawyer in federal court. For
noncapital defendants who typically have no habeas counsel in
federal court, there will be no federal habeas claims to default in
the first place.
Martinez thus is only of use to pro se petitioners who manage
to raise meritorious ineffectiveness claims in federal court, when
state postconviction counsel was either ineffective or, more likely,
not appointed at all. Most pro se prisoners are unlikely to be able
to investigate and then present, in federal court, a claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel that survives the initial
merits review Martinez prescribes; as noted above, ineffectiveness
claims almost always require the kind of extra-record
investigation and development that can only be accomplished by
collateral counsel and resources for investigation.150 In short,
states are no more encouraged to provide postconviction counsel
148. Id. at 1320 (majority opinion).
149. Id. at 1318.
150. Primus, Effective Trial Counsel, supra note 10, at 3 (“Because
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims are often predicated on what trial
attorneys failed to do, they frequently require extra-record development.”). That
is not to say that pro se prisoners will not file habeas petitions in federal court.
They likely will, and it is possible some may be successful, especially if they
raise purely record-based ineffectiveness claims. As Giovanna Shay and Chris
Lasch found when researching petitions for certiorari in the Supreme Court, pro
se petitioners in criminal cases file thousands of such petitions each year. See
Giovanna Shay & Christopher Lasch, Inflating a New Constitutional Dialogue:
The Increased Importance Under AEDPA of Seeking Certiorari from Judgments
of State Courts, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 247 n.178 (2008). But that
phenomenon would only affect state practice if pro se federal habeas petitions
were likely to be successful often enough that states found themselves having to
defend true merits inquiries. That is highly unlikely. See Uhrig, supra note 10,
at 1222 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 (1984))
In the trial context, the Supreme Court has recognized that ‘[w]hile a
criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to
enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of
unarmed prisoners to gladiators.’ What I witnessed in federal habeas
practice for non-capital, pro se litigants is precisely such a slaughter.
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after Martinez than Congress is to provide counsel to all would-be
federal habeas petitioners.151
That said, there is an unmistakable cast to the Court’s
decisions in Martinez and Maples that recognizes the value of
postconviction proceedings, in that—unlike appellate review—
such proceedings allow for the development and presentation of
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. As Justice Kagan
noted during oral argument in Trevino, the Court’s first postMartinez case, Martinez “was an equitable rule about giving
people an opportunity to raise a trial ineffectiveness claim.”152
Much like the Court’s ruling fifty years ago in Douglas
appreciated the value of an initial appeal as of right, these
decisions reflect an appreciation for the value of an
ineffectiveness claim that was absent in the Court’s Rehnquistera opinions.
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in Maples, for example, began by
calling out Alabama for its “low eligibility requirements for
lawyers appointed to represent indigent capital defendants at
trial”;153 for the lack of training it provides to, or requires of, these
lawyers;154 and for the fact that “[a]ppointed counsel in death
151. Steve Vladeck has also suggested that Justice Scalia’s concerns may be
overblown. He notes that Martinez “may in fact have the salutary effect of
putting a greater onus on state courts seriously to consider ineffective assistance
claims in state post-conviction proceedings,” and that, in any event, because the
Court’s rule was merely equitable, states may choose to forgo the procedural
default in federal court and raise a merits defense instead of choosing to provide
post-conviction counsel. Steve Vladeck, Opinion Analysis: A New Remedy, but
No Right, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 21, 2012, 10:30 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2012/03/opinion-analysis-a-new-remedy-but-no-right/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). I differ with Vladeck as well;
without any right to a lawyer in federal court, there is really no incentive for a
state to provide post-conviction counsel. States will only face the Hobson’s choice
Justice Scalia decries if an indigent prisoner manages to secure federal counsel
or files a pro se petition that survives initial review. Those cases are going to be
so infrequent that few states, if any, are going to conclude that the rule of
Martinez compels the blanket provision of state postconviction counsel.
152. Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 524
(2012) (No. 11-10189), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_argu
ments/argument_transcripts/11-10189.pdf.
153. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 917 (2012).
154. Id. (“Experience with capital cases is not required. Nor does the State
provide, or require appointed counsel to gain, any capital-case-specific
professional education or training.” (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted)).
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penalty cases are also undercompensated.”155 With respect to
Cory Maples’s two trial attorneys, the Court noted that only one
of them had ever served in a capital case, neither had ever tried
the penalty phase of a capital case, and their compensation for
work on Mr. Maples’s behalf was “capped at $1,000 for time spent
out-of-court preparing Maples’s case, and at $40 per hour for incourt services.”156
Maples’s discussion of the state of indigent trial-level defense
in capital cases in Alabama and of the representation Maples
received at trial was irrelevant to the Court’s holding. As Justice
Alito noted in his concurrence, “The quality of petitioner’s
representation at trial obviously played no role in the failure to
meet the deadline for filing his notice of appeal from the denial of
his state postconviction petition.”157
Yet the Court included the discussion anyway.158 Was it
simply to take the opportunity to knock Alabama for its
insufficient system of providing counsel to indigent capital
defendants? Perhaps. But more likely, it was included in the
ruling because the Court recognized that the failure of
postconviction counsel resulted in Maples’s inability to raise
(except in his initial postconviction petition to the Alabama trial
court) his facially legitimate claim that “his inexperienced and
underfunded attorneys failed to develop and raise an obvious
intoxication defense, did not object to several egregious instances
of prosecutorial misconduct, and woefully underprepared for the
penalty phase of the trial.”159 The claim of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel in this capital case was placed in jeopardy by
postconviction counsel’s abandonment of their client.
Following Maples, the Court in Martinez much more
explicitly placed a spotlight on the value of an ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claim, in a sharp departure from the
Court’s Rehnquist-era rhetoric. The Martinez Court was
particularly concerned not with whether prisoners had
postconviction counsel, but with whether criminal defendants had
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id. at 918.
Id. at 928 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 917–18 (majority opinion).
Id. at 919.

872

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 839 (2013)

a fair opportunity—indeed, any opportunity—to raise a claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel: “When an attorney errs in
initial-review collateral proceedings, it is likely that no state
court at any level will hear the prisoner’s claim.”160 And if state
procedural rules operate to preclude federal review of claims not
raised in state postconviction, no court will hear a petitioner’s
claims. Thus, the Court noted, when the ineffectiveness claim
cannot be raised earlier, “the collateral proceeding is in many
ways the equivalent of a prisoner’s direct appeal as to the
ineffective assistance claim.”161 The Court engaged in a somewhat
extended discussion of the nature of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claims, noting that such claims often turn on the
development of evidence outside of the trial record, which, as
noted above, is all but impossible to accomplish without the
assistance of counsel.162
The Court then made a striking statement: “A prisoner’s
inability to present a claim of trial error is of particular concern
when the claim is one of ineffective assistance of counsel.”163 This
assertion places ineffectiveness claims on par with, if not more
important than, other trial errors that would typically be raised
by appellate counsel (to which all indigent defendants are
constitutionally entitled). The Court noted that it made sense to
require ineffectiveness claims to be raised postconviction, as
Arizona did, but that “[b]y deliberately choosing to move trialineffectiveness claims outside of the direct-appeal process, where
counsel is constitutionally guaranteed, the State significantly
diminishes prisoners’ ability to file such claims.”164 As noted
above, the Court concluded by deciding that, as an equitable
matter, a prisoner may establish cause for the default of an
ineffectiveness claim either when counsel is not appointed in an
initial-review collateral proceeding or when appointed counsel in
the initial-review collateral proceeding was ineffective under
160. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012).
161. Id. at 1317.
162. See id. (“While confined to prison, the prisoner is in no position to
develop the evidentiary basis for a claim of ineffective assistance, which often
turns on evidence outside the trial record.”).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1318.
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Strickland standards (and either way, only when the claim has
some merit).165
The Court’s assertion in Martinez that a prisoner’s inability
to present a claim of trial error is “of particular concern”166 when
the claim is one of ineffective assistance of trial counsel echoed
not only the “bedrock” principles enshrined in Gideon but also
Justice Kennedy’s own concurrence in Giarratano, in which he
described collateral proceedings as “a central part of the review
process for prisoners sentenced to death.”167 If anything, his
opinion in Martinez represents an extension of that view, for it
comes in a noncapital case.
Both Maples and Martinez, in the way they privilege the
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, represent a marked
evolution from Justice Rehnquist’s opinions in Ross, Finley, and
Giarratano. No longer does the Court consider postconviction an
afterthought to the criminal process. Instead, at least with
respect to claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the
Court appears to be moving toward recognition that the right to
raise such claims is as important as the right to raise recordbased claims typically brought by constitutionally required
appellate counsel. My view is that this development is far more
significant than any signals the Court sent in Martinez with
respect to the provision of postconviction counsel generally.
B. What the Evolution Portends
This evolution in the jurisprudence may cautiously be
described as the triumph of Justice Kennedy’s more expansive
view of the role of postconviction over Justice Rehnquist’s
165. See id.
Allowing a federal habeas court to hear a claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel when an attorney’s errors (or the absence
of an attorney) caused the procedural default in an initial-review
collateral proceeding acknowledges, as an equitable matter, that the
initial-review collateral proceeding, if undertaken without counsel or
with ineffective counsel, may not have been sufficient to ensure that
proper consideration was given to a substantial claim.
166. Id. at 1312.
167. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 14 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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parsimonious approach. To date, it has amounted only to a
willingness on the part of the Court to provide an equitable
remedy (excusal of procedural default), as opposed to the
provision of constitutionally required postconviction counsel. The
limited nature of the remedy in Martinez and Maples is
undoubtedly a reflection, to some extent, of the lack of votes on
the Court for an expanded right to postconviction counsel. But it
can also be traced to an important distinction between capital
cases and most noncapital cases: States typically do not provide
postconviction counsel for noncapital defendants.168 They
typically do provide postconviction counsel for capital
defendants.169 Because of this reality, the existence, or lack, of a
constitutional right to postconviction counsel has radically
different implications in each context.
Commentators and many members of the capital
postconviction bar have long advocated for a constitutional right
to postconviction counsel,170 but not generally because such a rule
would provide counsel to death row inmates who would otherwise
go uncounseled. The relevance of a constitutional right to counsel
in the capital context is that, when appointed postconviction
counsel performs ineffectively and contributes to the finding of a
procedural bar, that ineffectiveness can be grounds for excusing
the procedural default in federal court (or perhaps even an
168. See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1322 (2012) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (referring to the “common state practice of not appointing counsel in
all first collateral proceedings”).
169. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 918 (2012) (noting that Alabama
is “nearly alone among the States” in not guaranteeing representation to
indigent capital defendants in postconviction).
170. See, e.g., Alice McGill, Comment, Murray v. Giarratano: Right to
Counsel in Postconviction Proceedings in Death Penalty Cases, 18 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 211, 212 (1990) (arguing that “the availability of postconviction
relief is meaningless without the assistance of counsel”); Smith & Starns, supra
note 18, at 56 (“It is the thesis of this article that the Eighth Amendment is
violated by any state that refuses [to appoint postconviction counsel in capital
cases].”); Alexander Rundlet, Comment, Opting for Death: State Responses to the
AEDPA’s Opt-In Provisions and the Need for a Right to Post-Conviction Counsel,
1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 661, 665–66 (1999) (arguing that fairness demands either a
congressional or constitutional requirement that states provide counsel in state
postconviction for capitally convicted defendants); Freedman, supra note 84, at
1103 (“Intelligent lawyers, judges, and legislators should not allow Giarratano
to divert them from doing what justice requires, and the Supreme Court should
abandon it.”).
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independent ground for some type of relief). Such a rule would
have led to a different result in Coleman, as well as many postColeman cases in which postconviction counsel fails to perform
effectively. Had postconviction counsel been constitutionally
required, the ineffectiveness of postconviction counsel would have
excused the default in those cases and allowed the federal court
to review the underlying constitutional claims on their merits.
(Martinez now provides this relief to some capital clients who can
establish the factual predicates for the Martinez exception.171)
By contrast, a constitutional right to postconviction counsel
in the noncapital context would mean the provision of counsel
when none has previously existed.
In short, a constitutional right to counsel for capital
defendants means ensuring the competence of the lawyers they
already have and protecting those defendants from their lawyers’
mistakes; for noncapital defendants, it means providing them
with a mechanism to raise postconviction claims in the first
instance. For capital defendants, the Maples–Martinez equitable
remedy of default excusal provides meaningful relief in the form
of a vehicle to allow federal court review of potentially
meritorious federal constitutional claims. For noncapital
defendants who have no counsel in state postconviction
proceedings, Maples and Martinez provide no actual immediate
benefit because the ability to excuse a default in federal court
means little to defendants who have no lawyer to file a federal
habeas petition.172
The distinction between capital and noncapital defendants is
important in terms of the legacy of Maples and Martinez because
most capital defendants already have a mechanism for bringing
ineffectiveness claims, even if they do not currently enjoy a right
to have those claims brought by constitutionally effective
counsel.173 For these defendants, Maples and Martinez provide a
171. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318 (establishing the circumstances in
which a prisoner may establish cause for a default).
172. Again, as noted above, this is why Justice Scalia’s concern that
Martinez effectively requires states to provide postconviction counsel is
unfounded. Supra note 147 and accompanying text.
173. While some state statutes require that postconviction counsel in capital
cases be effective, the violation of these state standards does not excuse a
procedural default in federal court, so long as Coleman generally remains good
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vehicle to have their trial counsel ineffectiveness claims heard
when their postconviction counsel fails them. For noncapital
cases, the relevance of Maples and Martinez is more elusive
because federal habeas counsel is so rarely provided.
The irony of what may be the legacy of Maples and Martinez
is that the Supreme Court appears more interested in a remedy
that allows ineffectiveness claims to be raised than it does in the
provision of postconviction counsel generally. Thus, while the
decisions provide cold comfort today for noncapital defendants
who are typically without federal habeas counsel to help them
take advantage of the Court’s equitable rulings, they presage a
postconviction landscape in which all prisoners are entitled to the
litigation of an ineffectiveness claim in at least one forum.
Put another way, the Supreme Court does not appear to be
on the verge of finding a broad constitutional right to
postconviction counsel, for anyone. But the Court seems clearly
concerned—much more so than during the Rehnquist era—with
convicted defendants’ ability to “get their day in court” with
respect to ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, even if
that day in court is only one day, in one state court. In the capital
context, in which counsel is typically provided in both state
postconviction and federal habeas proceedings,174 the Court can
cobble together procedural work-arounds—what Justice Scalia
called “word games” in Maples175—to ensure that day in court
without finding a constitutional right to counsel.
I suggest, however, that because the defendants in Maples
and Martinez had postconviction counsel, and in particular
because they had attorneys to raise facially meritorious
ineffectiveness claims in federal habeas petitions, the Court was
able to fashion a remedy to excuse the federal court default
without having to consider seriously a constitutional right to
state postconviction counsel. Indeed, the fact that virtually all
capital defendants have federal habeas counsel enables the
law.
174. By statute, counsel is provided to all indigent capital defendants in
federal habeas proceedings. 18 U.S.C. § 3599 (2008).
175. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 933 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“No precedent should
be so easily circumvented by word games . . . .”). And it was able to do so in
Martinez as well, when the noncapital defendant in that case happened to have
secured pro bono state postconviction counsel.
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equitable approach the Court took in these two cases.176 But the
cases provide procedural protections that—when not coupled with
a constitutional right to counsel—are of little use to noncapital
defendants. In other words, the provision of postconviction
counsel in capital cases has led to decisions, such as Martinez and
Maples, that almost, but do not quite, vindicate the Court’s
concerns regarding the ability to raise a claim that trial counsel
was ineffective.
Recall Justice Kennedy’s statement for the Court in
Martinez, implying that it is as important to provide a
mechanism to raise an ineffectiveness claim as it is to raise a
record-based trial error claim.177 If that is the case, then the right
to counsel to raise an ineffectiveness claim must be as grounded
in constitutional guarantees as the right to counsel to raise a
claim on direct appeal was in Douglas.178 That is why Martinez
and Maples in fact portend greater protections for the rights of
noncapital defendants to litigate claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel. They implicitly envision an expansion of Douglas that
provides not just constitutionally mandated appellate counsel but
some form of constitutionally mandated counsel to raise
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
The Court needs to go further than it did in Martinez or
Maples, however, in order to effectuate any meaningful ability on
the part of noncapital defendants to raise a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. An equitable remedy that provides an
176. See 18 U.S.C. § 3599(2) (2012)
In any post conviction proceeding under section 2254 or 2255 of title
28, United States Code, seeking to vacate or set aside a death
sentence, any defendant who is or becomes financially unable to
obtain adequate representation or investigative, expert, or other
reasonably necessary services shall be entitled to the appointment of
one or more attorneys . . . .
See also McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 854–55 (1994) (construing 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(q)(4)(B) as granting “indigent capital defendants a mandatory right to
qualified legal counsel and related services ‘[i]n any [federal] post conviction
proceeding’” (footnote omitted)).
177. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012).
178. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (“But where the
merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without
benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been drawn between
rich and poor.”).
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excuse for default is of little use to a pro se federal habeas
petitioner attempting to raise a meritorious ineffectiveness claim.
While a blanket constitutional right to postconviction counsel
seems out of reach with the Court as it is currently constituted,
there seems no other way to provide for a day in court other than
to hold that the Sixth Amendment requires the provision of
counsel for defendants to raise, at the least, trial level
ineffectiveness claims in one forum.
Admittedly, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that a
constitutional requirement to some form of “ineffectiveness
counsel” (or perhaps, as well, counsel to raise other, extra-record
claims that can only be brought in initial-review collateral
proceedings) would not impose a significant burden on the states.
Unlike the equitable ruling in Martinez that permits states to
gamble on the occasionally successful pro se federal habeas
petitioner, such a constitutional ruling would require states to
either amend their procedures to provide for meaningful
opportunity (i.e., time, resources, and independent counsel) to
raise trial ineffectiveness claims prior to collateral review,179 or
they will have to fund counsel to investigate and, when
appropriate raise, postconviction, trial ineffectiveness claims.
Because ineffectiveness claims comprise the majority of the
claims raised postconviction, the cost of providing counsel to raise
ineffectiveness claims may be similar to the cost of providing
postconviction counsel generally.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to address the resource
implications of an expanded right to postconviction counsel of
some vintage. But I will observe that if the states devoted
appropriate resources toward improving representation at the
trial level, the postconviction process would not be as critical as it
179. For the reasons explained above, supra note 19, and as the Court
acknowledged in Martinez, it is likely impractical to force ineffectiveness claims
into motion for new trial or appellate proceedings. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at
1318 (“Ineffective-assistance claims often depend on evidence outside the trial
record. Direct appeals, without evidentiary hearings, may not be as effective as
other proceedings for developing the factual basis for the claim.”). The Court has
already made clear that it does not view direct appeal as an appropriate forum
in which to raise most claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Massaro v.
United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504–05 (2003) (stating that “in most cases a motion
brought under [28 U.S.C.] § 2255 is preferable to direct appeal for deciding
claims of ineffective assistance”).
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is now to rooting out trial-level error.180 Particularly given the
fact that the vast majority of noncapital cases result in negotiated
settlements,181 and given that the Court has now clarified that
defendants have a right to effective counsel at the pleabargaining stage,182 one could argue that, now more than ever,
the entire system would benefit from increased devotion of
resources at the front end.
It may also be possible to envision some constitutional right
to “ineffectiveness counsel” in state court to raise the
ineffectiveness of trial counsel only when the petitioner can show
some colorable claim to trial counsel’s ineffectiveness.183 But
180. In the capital context, Eric Freedman has argued that
[t]he single most meaningful reform of the capital punishment
system, short of its abolition, would be the provision of effective trial
counsel, through a system that provided adequate compensation,
expert resources, and the training and support needed to practice in
this esoteric field. If that happened—and nowhere has it to date—
there would be far fewer convictions and death sentences, but those
few would be much more likely to stick. That is an outcome that
would be in the best interests of all concerned. When the government
attempts to evade costs at the front end, they emerge at the back
end . . . .
Eric M. Freedman, Earl Washington’s Ordeal, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1089, 1106–
07 (2001) (citations omitted); see also Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and
Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 15
(1990)
[T]he provision of knowledgeable counsel at trial would restore the
trial as the “main event” in the criminal process because
constitutional issues would be first recognized, aired, and resolved at
that level, rather than later. As a result, there would be fewer
colorable claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and fewer of the
reversals and retrials that now so frequently and substantially
prolong the process.
181. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (“Ninety-seven
percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are
the result of guilty pleas.”); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012)
(“[C]riminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of
trials.”).
182. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 (holding that “as a general rule, defense
counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to
accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused”);
Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388 (holding that a defendant who receives ineffective
advice that results in rejection of a plea offer and conviction at trial may be
entitled to relief).
183. For example, one could look to the provision of counsel in federal
habeas proceedings. Noncapital pro se petitioners receive appointed counsel in
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because indigent prisoners are so limited in their ability to
research or investigate their cases, such a standard would have to
be extremely liberal in order to have any meaning at all.184 More
likely, the Court’s concern that defendants have their day in
court with respect to an ineffectiveness claim could only be
vindicated through the provision of counsel who would be tasked
with investigating and raising, when colorable, a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
In any event, despite the burdens, the conclusion is
inescapable. If, in Douglas, which, to be sure, was written by a
very different Court in a very different era, the Court held that
an unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor
when the former is entitled to a lawyer on appeal but the latter is
not,185 the Court’s recognition of the importance of ineffectiveness
claims demands the same result.
federal habeas cases only when they can establish that an evidentiary hearing is
required or when it is “in the interest of justice,” with a wide range of
interpretation across courts and circuits. See, e.g., PRISON LAW OFFICE, FEDERAL
HABEAS MANUAL § 4:25 (“There is a statutory right to appointed counsel in a
§ 2254 proceeding under Rule 8(c) if an evidentiary hearing is required.”
(citations omitted)). Federal courts have substantial discretion in deciding when
to appoint counsel to noncapital habeas petitioners, and consider additional
factors, including the complexity of the record; whether a petitioner can
competently represent himself in a habeas proceeding; likelihood of success on
merits; and the ability of an indigent petitioner to investigate and present his
case. See, e.g., Schultz v. Wainwright, 701 F.2d 900, 901 (11th Cir. 1983)
(“Counsel must be appointed for an indigent federal habeas petitioner only when
the interests of justice or due process so require.”); Shaird v. Scully, 610 F.
Supp. 442, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating that a determination of whether counsel
should be appointed “requires a close examination and evaluation of certain
factors,” including the likelihood of success, complexity of the issues, and the
ability of the indigent to investigate and present the case).
184. See, e.g., Primus, supra note 21, at 603 (noting that it is very difficult, if
not impossible, for a prison inmate without counsel to gather extra-record
evidence sufficient to establish prejudice under the ineffective assistance of
counsel standard); Smith & Starns, supra note 18, at 88–100 (establishing the
many ways in which indigent prisoners are ill-equipped to develop and raise
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel). Martinez itself acknowledges this.
See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012) (“Without the help of an
adequate attorney, a prisoner will have similar difficulties vindicating a
substantial ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim.”).
185. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (“But where the
merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without
benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been drawn between
rich and poor.”).

RIGHT TO LITIGATE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

881

V. Conclusion
Martinez and Maples offer hope for capital and noncapital
defendants, but in very different ways. The equitable nature of
the Court’s rulings means that, for capitally convicted prisoners,
there is now some hope that, when postconviction counsel fails
them, there may still be an opportunity to have their ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claims heard in federal court. As
several commentators have suggested, these equitable exceptions
should be expanded to cover an even greater number of cases.186
So long as the remedy remains equitable, however, prisoners
without counsel to file federal habeas petitions will enjoy little
benefit. Thus, for noncapital defendants, Maples and Martinez
are far less helpful in the near term than they are for capital
defendants.
That said, the Court’s renewed emphasis on the importance
of postconviction, because of its role in the facilitation of
ineffectiveness claims, is a welcome evolution in the Court’s
jurisprudence. The logic of Maples and Martinez provides hope for
the provision of constitutionally mandated postconviction counsel,
even if in a limited role, to enable at least one day in court on an
ineffectiveness claim. If I am right about that, and the Court
eventually adopts a rule that actually ensures states provide
counsel to investigate and raise ineffectiveness claims (as
186. Although grounded in specific, articulated concerns about the ability of
convicted defendants to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, it is
certainly true that the essential logic of Martinez would apply to other claims
that could not have been raised until initial-review collateral proceedings, such
as claims alleging government suppression of exculpatory evidence. See King,
supra note 8 (wondering whether the Court will “withstand the
inevitable pressure to expand [Martinez] to Brady, jury misconduct, and other
late-discovered claims”); Michael O’Hear, A Good Week for the Right to Counsel,
LIFE SENTENCES BLOG (Mar. 23, 2012, 2:24 PM), http://www.life
sentencesblog.com/?p=4582 (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (“[T]here may be an
argument that Martinez should apply whenever the legal or factual basis of any
type of claim is not reasonably available during the direct review process.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). As Chris Lasch points out in a
pre-Martinez article, there are a number of claims other than ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claims that are typically “not susceptible to
presentation before collateral review.” Lasch, supra note 20, at 45–46 (listing
claims). Whether the courts are willing to apply the equitable principles of
Martinez to such claims is an open question, but one that will likely be
answered sooner rather than later.
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opposed to merely creating tentative incentives for them to do so),
capital defendants will benefit from the increased ability to
establish cause for procedural default in federal court. But the
real sea change will be with respect to the many more noncapital
defendants who will be able to surface violations of Gideon in a
way that has never before been possible. This aspect of Maples
and Martinez holds the greatest promise for the vindication of
Gideon’s “bedrock principle.”187

187.

Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317.

